



FELIX OBERHOLZER-GEE

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## Alibaba's Taobao (A)

In early 2008, the Hangzhou-based Alibaba Group operated China's leading online marketplaces: Alibaba.com, an international business-to-business (B2B) exchange that assisted small and medium-sized Chinese enterprises in finding overseas trading partners; Alibaba.com.cn, the company's B2B site for domestic trade; and Taobao, a B2C and C2C exchange for Chinese retailers and consumers. The group also ran a web portal (Yahoo! China), an online payment services provider (Alipay) and a marketplace for online advertising inventory (Alimama). By 2008, Alibaba Group had captured about one half of B2B e-commerce in China.

The group's quickly growing consumer site, Taobao (淘宝, "hunting for treasures"), had attracted particular attention after it managed to displace the once dominant eBay, the world's largest consumer marketplace. After spending hundreds of millions of dollars trying to defend its presence in China, at the end of 2006, eBay management cut its losses and shut its site, acknowledging Taobao's appeal among consumers and retailers.<sup>1</sup> With a market share among C2C players of 84% in 2007, Taobao had become China's leading consumer e-commerce marketplace, facilitating transactions valued at RMB43 billion.<sup>a</sup>

By spring of 2006 it had become apparent that Taobao was pulling away from its closest rival eBay. However, the company had little revenue because it offered its services free of charge. In a first move to test a monetization model, Taobao launched a value-added service called Zhao Cai Jin Bao (招财进宝, "bringing wealth and riches"). The service let sellers bid for keywords, ranking paid listings ahead of free listings and collecting a fee when a transaction relating to the paid listing was completed through Taobao. As the company rolled out Zhao Cai Jin Bao, the executive team waited in suspense. Would the service be a success? Had Taobao chosen the right way to monetize its marketplace?

### Alibaba's B2B Platform

Jack Ma founded Alibaba with the support of a group of friends in December 1998. Ma, a former teacher who had experience building websites for Chinese companies, created Alibaba to assist small and medium-sized companies (SMEs) in selling their products on the internet. Ma explained: "There

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<sup>a</sup> In mid 2008, 100RMB equaled US\$14.6.



are more than 40 million SMEs in China. Many of them operate in fragmented markets, with limited access to communication channels and information sources that would help market and promote their products. A critical difficulty is that many SMEs have no way to evaluate the trustworthiness of their trading partners."

At the outset, the website offered little more than a bulletin board on which a few businesses posted trade leads. But a decade later, more than 32 million registered users relied on Alibaba's B2B platform to find trading partners, and the group had built a sophisticated ecosystem around its core business. Posting a trade lead on Alibaba remained free, but about one percent of registered companies purchased premium subscriptions to display their products and storefronts on Alibaba's marketplaces. Premium subscribers operated their own storefront on Alibaba, and the company assisted them in building and maintaining their websites (**Exhibit 1** shows the site of Zhejiang Sunkey Industrial Co., a manufacturer of aluminum profiles.) Scott Ni, director of site operations at Alibaba, explained: "We visit the factories of our members to shoot videos and take pictures of products. We also create their website and produce promotional materials to showcase our companies at tradeshows."

The storefronts of premium subscribers provided detailed product information, a virtual tour of the company, and TrustPass verification. Under the TrustPass program, Alibaba asked third parties to verify the corporate registration and banking information of its members. TrustPass members were also able to view and post feedback on other TrustPass companies.

Alibaba's B2B marketplaces thrived. In 2007, the company tripled its operating profit to RMB804.3 million on revenues of RMB2,163 million (**Exhibit 2** provides financial information). Premium subscribers using the international marketplace ([www.alibaba.com](http://www.alibaba.com)) paid an annual fee of RMB50,000. These fees generated about 70% of company revenue. With 23 million registered users, the company's site for domestic trade ([www.alibaba.com.cn](http://www.alibaba.com.cn)) was much larger but less important financially, with 266,000 premium subscribers each paying RMB2,800 for a standard China TrustPass package. As of 2007, the company had 700,000 storefronts on its international marketplace and 2.26 million storefronts on its China marketplace. Additional sources of income were promotional placements, banner advertising, and paid keyword searches. Companies paid up to RMB120,000 annually to have their name listed first when buyers searched for a popular item.

At the end of 2007, Alibaba listed its B2B business (marketplaces [Alibaba.com](http://Alibaba.com) and [Alibaba.com.cn](http://Alibaba.com.cn)) in Hong Kong, selling 19.25% of the company's enlarged share capital and raising US\$ 1.7 billion. The market responded enthusiastically, driving the company's P/E ratio to 320 in post-IPO trading (**Exhibit 3** provides share price information). Taobao and the group's other businesses remained privately held. Each group company had its own executive team (president, CFO, and vice presidents responsible for the operating units) and its own board of directors. The overriding objective was to encourage the businesses to be best in their industry. Ma explained: "Business unit presidents must have the freedom to do what is right for their business. I want business units to compete with each other."

With group companies given free reign to develop on their own and capture new opportunities, it was natural that company's activities would not always be aligned. Joe Tsai, CFO of Alibaba Group, described an example: "Alipay's primary objective is to be a leader in payment processing which requires it to develop its own client base of online merchants. However, these clients could be other e-commerce websites that compete directly with Taobao. For example, Joyo.com is a client of Alipay, yet is a subsidiary of Amazon, a company that competes with Taobao."



## Taobao

Porter Erisman, Vice President of International Corporate Affairs, remembered the beginnings of Taobao well: "Jack told me in April 2003 that he wanted to pursue a new venture. The project was to be top secret. Seven employees started to work on Taobao that month. The team was hidden off-site in Jack's old apartment where Alibaba was born. They spent day and night there and were not even allowed to tell their families and friends what project they were working on."

Ma had carefully observed the rise of eBay in China. The U.S. company had entered China by investing US\$30 million in EachNet in 2002. EachNet, a Chinese online auction founded in 1999 by Tan Haiyin (HBS 1999) and Shao Yibo (HBS 1999), mostly catered to early internet users, many of whom were tech-savvy computer enthusiasts (see **Exhibit 4** for internet penetration rates). At the time of eBay's investment, EachNet commanded an 85% market share with revenues of RMB12 million. In June 2003, eBay CEO Meg Whitman (HBS 1979) acquired the remaining 67% stake in Eachnet, rebranding the site as eBay EachNet.<sup>2</sup> Whitman had high hopes for her company's venture, predicting that "China could be eBay's largest local market in a five-to-ten-year period."<sup>3</sup>

Ma explained his concern over eBay's entry:

eBay grew strongly. At that time, there were only two companies in China that understood online marketplaces, eBay and Alibaba. I was particularly concerned that eBay's power sellers would grow their business to compete in the B2B space. In China, the line between individuals and small businesses is blurry. There are many people with entrepreneurial ambitions. I needed to stop eBay to protect Alibaba.

### *Marketplace Design*

Taobao sought to distinguish itself from eBay in numerous ways. Ma wanted to imbue Taobao with a strong local culture that reflected a deep understanding of Chinese consumers and an attitude of informality. Taobao's president, Sun Tongyu, explained: "We ask Taobao employees to select a nickname and refer to each other by it. The nicknames come from fictional characters in Jin Yong's famous kung fu novels."

Yu Yan, the Taobao nickname of Zhang Yu, vice president in charge of C2C marketplace operations at the company, explained the cultural differences between Taobao and eBay, pointing out differences in the design of the two websites (see **Exhibit 5** for sample homepages): "Chinese consumers like busy web designs with strong colors. Westerners prefer sparse sites like Google's, but Chinese customers want their sites to be noisy, with lots of links."

Added Erisman: "We got the navigation right. Our design was much more usable for Chinese eyes. It reflected how Chinese shoppers think. Even some small details, such as including a men's navigational tab and a women's navigational tab, made the navigation more suitable to China's online shoppers. It was like being in a Chinese department store."

### *Trust*

To attract buyers and sellers, the company needed to find a way to engender trust between vendors and customers. This was particularly challenging in the Chinese context. Professor Paul Ingram of Columbia Business School, who studied social networks, explained:

In the West, we tend to reserve trust from the heart (affect-based trust) for family and friends and trust from the head (cognition-based trust) for business partners. We see emotional concerns in business as unprofessional. But in China, affect- and cognition-based trust are highly intertwined, even in business.<sup>4</sup> It is important that business partners have an affective bond. Few Chinese business relationships develop without socio-emotional exchanges such as sharing meals, gifts, and socializing with each other's family.

Taobao developed a number of mechanisms to help create trust between sellers and buyers.

- Taobao sellers needed to register using their national identity card and bank account information.
- As eBay, Taobao allowed buyers and vendors to provide feedback for each other. Taobao distinguished between a person's reputation as a seller and a buyer. (eBay provided only one score for each user.) Sellers on eBay tended to have more positive reputation scores (almost 50% had no negative scores in a six-month window) compared to sellers on Taobao (14% had no negative scores).<sup>5</sup> Taobao sellers who provided feedback on a buyer automatically received a positive rating if the buyer did not respond within 45 days.
- In 2004, the company introduced Alipay (支付宝, "payment treasure"), an escrow service designed to eliminate settlement risk among trading parties. Using Alipay, a buyer deposited payment for an outstanding order in an Alipay account; Alipay informed the seller when it received the funds, and the seller then shipped the goods. When the buyer informed Alipay that the merchandise had arrived, it instructed its bank to release the funds to the seller. Erisman explained the significance of Alipay:

Alipay was critical to Taobao's development. Even when buyers see a seller with high ratings, the lack of trust still creates a big challenge. Alipay eliminates the settlement risk. The payment mechanism itself is not important. Payment is easy in China. People are used to wiring money; they can even do it online. But banks cannot address the settlement risk. This is where Alipay comes in. Now more than 80 percent of Taobao transactions rely on Alipay.

Taobao members were able to use Alipay free of charge. On eBay, there were many buyers who complained that they did not receive an item. Thanks to Alipay, this problem barely existed on Taobao.<sup>6</sup>

- Taobao invested significant resources to facilitate communication between buyers and sellers and between users and the company. It embedded an instant-messaging service, Wangwang, in its website, allowing buyers to directly haggle with sellers, a process which both sides seemed to enjoy (see **Exhibit 6**). Yu Yan explained: "Buyers and sellers use our instant-messaging service to provide continuous feedback, ask for assistance, and make suggestions." As a result, "communication problems" comprised only 8% of Taobao's non-positive feedback. At eBay, this share stood at 20%.<sup>7</sup>

### *Fees*

Unlike its U.S. competitor, Taobao did not charge listing or transactions fees. Erisman explained: "E-commerce was new in China. People were wary of scams. Chinese consumers were not familiar with online marketplaces, and merchants were reluctant to sell online without significant incentives. They wanted the marketplace to be free so they could dip their toes in the water."



Ma directly challenged Whitman: "We call on eBay to do what's right for this phase of China's e-commerce development and make its services free for buyers and sellers in China."

Whitman was not amused: "Free is not a business model. It speaks volumes about the strength of eBay's business in China that Taobao is unable to charge for its products."<sup>8</sup>

Locked into a head-to-head race, in 2004 it remained uncertain whether Taobao or eBay would prevail (**Exhibit 7** compares user satisfaction levels in this period).

### *Competition*

**eBay** By the time Taobao entered the C2C segment, eBay's global revenues were US\$2,165.1 million and the company had about 5,700 employees. In addition to its dominant position in the U.S., eBay had established a local presence in 19 countries. Creating a global marketplace was critical to eBay's strategy: "A key element of our growth strategy is to continually expand the eBay marketplace to new communities around the world." In 2003, international markets accounted for 35% of the company's net revenues—more than a five-fold increase from 2000.

eBay had successfully expanded into international markets using the same basic business model. In 2001, eBay claimed to be the dominant platform in four of its overseas markets: Australia, Canada, Germany and the U.K. eBay's international expansion strategy was to enter countries with a large degree of internet penetration and computer usage, then on a case-by-case basis, determine whether to start from scratch, do an acquisition or enter into a partnership. In Germany, eBay entered via acquisition in 1999 by buying Alando.de, the premier auction site in that country. The company achieved similar success in the U.K. where eBay crushed its competition. In 2002, in response to eBay's achievements, Yahoo withdrew from the internet-auction business throughout most of Europe.

In contrast to Europe, eBay struggled and eventually lost the Japanese market to Yahoo. eBay's failure was due to a series of missteps. Yahoo managed to enter Japan first, a full five months before eBay. Masahiro Inoue, president and CEO of Yahoo Japan, explained: "It was critical to be first. We knew catching up with a front-runner is hard in auctions."<sup>9</sup>

Inoue was so concerned about achieving quick success that he asked his 120 employees to list items for sale to make the website look busy in the first few weeks. Once eBay entered, Japanese consumers perceived its site as insufficiently localized and expensive. eBay emphasized the used-collectibles business, thinking that the development of the market would mirror the US. However, Japanese auction users were more interested in new goods. And while Yahoo's auction site was free, eBay charged commissions of 1.25% to 5% and required sellers to provide credit card numbers, a hassle for young Japanese who preferred to pay cash on delivery. Two years after its launch, Yahoo dominated the Japanese auction market, achieving a 95% share. In 2002, eBay conceded defeat and pulled out.

Eager to learn from its experience in Japan, eBay entered the Chinese market early, acquiring the market leader EachNet. eBay gave broad autonomy to the 150-person EachNet team, including Shao who remained in place as CEO. The company relied on website usability, marketing sophistication and strategic execution to defend its leading position. eBay charged Chinese sellers listing fees (up to 3RMB) and transactions fees of up to 2% of the item's value.

In 2005, eBay introduced its PayPal service to China to help transactions close more quickly. PayPal was a free service for all users. The same year, the company formed a strategic alliance with



B2B facilitator Global Sources Ltd. The new partnership was aimed at eBay "PowerSellers" worldwide who gained an easy way to source their products directly from manufacturers in China.

**PaiPai** While Taobao and eBay dominated consumer marketplaces in China, there were several smaller sites, Paipai being the most significant. Paipai.com was the e-commerce platform owned by Tencent Technology (Shenzhen) Company Limited. Tencent, a company listed in Hong Kong with revenue of RMB3.8 billion and net profit RMB1.6 billion, operated China's most popular instant messaging service, QQ. At the time of Paipai's launch, QQ had 170 million active accounts. "Our advantage is our huge community base, which allows us to tap various potentials in mobile and Internet areas," Tencent CFO Patrick Tsang said.<sup>10</sup> Paipai was seamlessly integrated with QQ. The site offered its services for free. "We don't expect Paipai to bring in profits in the short term," explained Tencent chairman Pony Ma.<sup>11</sup>

### *Market Leadership*

In 2005, two years after Taobao's launch, the battle between Ma and Whitman was decided: the mighty eBay had fallen. By the end of 2007, Taobao had achieved a leading position in C2C commerce in China, leaving an ever-smaller share of business to its competitors (see **Exhibit 8** for market share information and **Exhibit 9** for patterns of growth). At the end of 2006, eBay shut its site. The company entered into a joint venture with Hong Kong-based Tom Online, hoping a local partner would enable it to stage a come-back.

By 2007, Taobao had reached a gross merchandise volume (GMV) of RMB43 billion, making it the second-largest retailer in China. Analysts estimated online shopping would grow at a rate exceeding 50% in the next 5 years. Taobao transactions data showed the company continued to deepen its reach. Online shopping, traditionally popular in the more affluent cities along China's coast, grew quickly in 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> tier cities. In addition, the mix of products shifted from higher-end technical gadgets to day-to-day merchandise (see **Exhibit 10**). Ma's vision of the company had evolved as well: "The retail infrastructure in China is terrible, extremely inefficient. Taobao will replace these traditional channels. We are now building the new Wal-Mart—online!"

### **Monetizing Taobao**

For all its success, Taobao still had little revenue. Monetizing transactions had not been a priority for the company. Erisman remembered: "Jack was notorious for saying that we have no revenue model. The most important thing is to have critical mass. It gives you time to figure out what customers want. Let people make money. Let them use Taobao before we make money."

In a first attempt at monetization in May 2006, Taobao developed a new service, Zhao Cai Jin Bao. Similar to Google's auctions for keywords, sellers on Taobao were offered the opportunity to bid on keywords to influence the order in which the search results for listed items would appear. Taobao typically displayed 20 search results on its first page. Zhao Cai Jin Bao would determine the order for the top one half of these listings. Zhao Cai Jin Bao offered pay-for-performance contracts. Sellers would only have to pay their bid if a customer actually bought the advertised product.


Alibaba's executive team wondered whether they had taken the right approach to monetizing Taobao. Was Zhao Cai Jin Bao, a hybrid between the approaches pioneered by eBay and Google, the future of online marketplaces?



## Exhibit 1 Zhejiang Sunkey's Website on Alibaba

Zhejiang Sunkey Industrial Co., Ltd.

Home | Products | Selling Leads | TrustPass Profile | About Us | Contacts

search our products 

**Products**


- Aluminum Profiles [57]
- Aluminum Windows [194]
- Aluminum Curtain Wall [14]
- Aluminum Industrial Profile [38]
- Aluminum Thermal-Break Window Profile [31]
- Others [65]

**Company Profile**

**Trade Show**

**Contact Us**


Zhejiang Sunkey Industrial Co., Ltd.




Established in 2005, Zhejiang Sunkey Industrial Co., Ltd. is a specialized manufacturer of construction aluminum and industrial aluminum profiles. Our company is located in Ningbo City of the eastern Zhejiang Province and next to Shanghai City. ...  
Read more

Offline See more


**Selected Products**




Aluminum Industrial Profile




Aluminum Construction Profiles



80GT Thermal Break Sliding Window



Aluminium Industrial Profile



Aluminum Profile

Source: Company documents.

## Exhibit 2 Alibaba.com Ltd.—Financial Information

Consolidated Income Statement (RMB '000)	2007	2006
<b>Revenue</b>		
International marketplace	1,547,695	991,869
China marketplace	615,062	371,993
<b>Total revenue</b>	<b>2,162,757</b>	<b>1,363,862</b>
Cost of revenue	(280,113)	(237,625)
<b>Gross profit</b>	<b>1,882,644</b>	<b>1,126,237</b>
Sales and marketing expenses	(736,813)	(610,198)
Product development expenses	(131,495)	(105,486)
General and administrative expenses	(229,868)	(159,969)
Other operating income	19,877	17,912
<b>Profit from operations</b>	<b>804,345</b>	<b>268,496</b>
Finance income, net	345,099	22,892
<b>Profit before income taxes</b>	<b>1,149,444</b>	<b>291,388</b>
<b>Income tax charges</b>	<b>(181,649)</b>	<b>(71,450)</b>
Profit attributable to equity owners of the Company	<b>967,795</b>	<b>219,938</b>

Source: Company documents.



## Exhibit 2 (continued) Alibaba.com Ltd. – Financial Information

Consolidated Balance Sheet (RMB '000)	2007	2006
<b>Assets</b>		
Non-current assets		
Lease prepayment	29,088	-
Property and equipment	158,992	113,304
Deferred tax assets	260,311	211,875
Prepayments, deposits and other receivables	27,067	
Deferred costs	10,767	4,988
<b>Total non-current assets</b>	<b>486,225</b>	<b>330,167</b>
<b>Current assets</b>		
Amounts due from related companies	26,320	25,148
Prepayments, deposits and other receivables	48,143	36,389
Deferred costs	219,229	163,392
Restricted cash		781
Term deposits with original maturities of over three months	952,382	1,051,000
Cash and cash equivalents	4,321,170	437,804
<b>Total current assets</b>	<b>5,567,244</b>	<b>1,714,514</b>
<b>Total assets</b>	<b>6,053,469</b>	<b>2,044,681</b>
<b>Equity</b>		
Capital and reserves		
Share capital	486	
Share premium	2,893,132	
Capital reserve	(55,787)	354,533
Exchange reserve	20,357	3,937
Statutory reserves	119,615	58,223
Retained earnings/(Accumulated deficit)	635,278	(271,125)
<b>Total equity</b>	<b>3,613,081</b>	<b>145,568</b>
<b>Liabilities</b>		
Non-current liabilities		
Deferred revenue	70,194	37,146
<b>Current liabilities</b>		
Deferred revenue and customer advances	1,849,655	1,216,818
Trade payables	12,883	8,698
Amounts due to related companies	17,039	161,538
Other payables and accruals	337,085	172,281
Dividend payable	-	195,909
Current income tax liabilities	153,532	106,723
<b>Total current liabilities</b>	<b>2,370,194</b>	<b>1,861,967</b>
<b>Total liabilities</b>	<b>2,440,388</b>	<b>1,899,113</b>
<b>Total equity and liabilities</b>	<b>6,053,469</b>	<b>2,044,681</b>
<b>Net current assets/(liabilities)</b>	<b>3,197,050</b>	<b>(147,453)</b>
<b>Total assets less current liabilities</b>	<b>3,683,275</b>	<b>182,714</b>

Source: Company documents.



Exhibit 3 Alibaba and Main Competitors - Share Price Information



Source: Company documents.

Exhibit 4 Internet Penetration

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Internet users (millions)	59	76	94	111	137	210
Internet penetration	4.6%	6.2%	7.3%	8.5%	10.5%	16.0%
Broadband users (millions)	6.6	17.4	42.8	64.3	90.7	163.4
Broadband penetration	11.2%	21.9%	45.5%	57.9%	66.2%	77.8%

Source: Company documents.

Exhibit 5a Taobao Homepage May 2003

淘宝 生活的酷体验!

卖家通道 买家通道 淘宝者联盟 服务中心

会员登录名:  密码:  我来了!

浏览时自动登陆:  我忘记了密码!

如何买卖? 关于一口价! 怎样拍卖? 付费广告刊登?

这里多的是你想要淘的“宝”!

搜索 热门的商品类目 浏览类目

索尼 DCR-VX2000  
日本最新科技! 索尼公司荣誉出品! 全新, 没有使用过!  
一口价: ¥12000/款

宫廷时尚沙发  
今年英国最流行的宫廷沙发, 上100种款式!  
开价: ¥20000/款

诺基亚 8390  
全新瑞典诺基亚8390彩屏手机, 有摄像头!  
拍卖起价: ¥6000

ELLE  
所有商品8折优惠!  
现有多种最新款式。  
欲购从速!

POLO 2003年夏季最新款T-恤, 现有红, 蓝, 黄, 紫多种颜色可供选择!  
欢迎商谈价格!

ELLE 1999年款登山军靴!  
多种尺码, 黑色, 褐色可供大家选择!  
一口价: ¥1200

逛逛店铺一条街!

首页 - 卖东西 - 注册会员 - 登录 - 帮助

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Source: Company documents accessed via Internet Wayback Machine.



Exhibit 5b Taobao Homepage July 2008



Source: Company documents accessed via Internet Wayback Machine.



Exhibit 5c eBay Homepage January 2003

交易乐趣  
eBay 携手合作

首页 搜索 付费中心 注册 登录

买东西 卖东西 我的易趣 诚信与安全 易趣社区 帮助

看看碟,听听歌,翻翻书...放假的感觉真好~

每日精选  
· DIY电脑配件 留下你的创意  
· 年度最走红手机火热销售中  
· 每日一拍:你想要的个性时尚  
· 一元起拍匹克冷面篮球鞋  
· 音乐和书籍,享受自己每一秒

我要推荐 购买推荐位

新到商品	开始时间
e.e.c.h.威动驱动程序! 钱半要半送!	04-10 01:50
自用电脑便宜卖	04-10 01:50
【代购】全新 黑色键盘3D鼠标套件 60元...	04-10 01:50
【代购】全新 博京32速刻录机 388元	04-10 01:50
~H2O+美白去死皮面膜30ml【绿瘦红肥】	04-10 01:50
【代购】DELL奔腾II368笔记本电脑 3798...	04-10 01:50
***温茶的眼镜***月亮石吊坠 已售售 1...	04-10 01:50
北京联通100元打北京卡	04-10 01:50
90元! 限:翻快速改良 快速清货减	04-10 01:50

想和他们一样成功吗?  
2003年来了,又是新的一年,希望易趣阿能越办越好,希望“平安的心善花园”在新的一年里红红火火,商品一定要卖的多多!  
· 不二家牛奶酥真皮钱包  
· 2003版阿能越的皮扣鞋  
>>去看看我的店铺吧  
· 更多精彩人物故事~

想玩得爽 必有好装备  
ES/FS2 游戏机 ES/FS2 配套软件  
GANERBY/任天堂 GANERBY/任天堂 配套软件  
DC/世嘉 DC/世嘉 配套软件  
游戏操作杆/方向盘手柄  
其它游戏机 电子宠物/其它玩具  
游戏软件  
RPG 即时战略 动作 射击  
其他电脑游戏软件

迎新春 商品特卖场  
一元起无底价专区  
运动鞋  
运动包  
户外运动  
运动踏青在于春  
网球拍  
羽毛球拍  
健身器材  
户外运动  
户外服装  
办张健身卡  
娱乐购物真欢喜  
量而出  
去旅游  
淘便宜货

想知道浏览量多成交率高的奥秘?  
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太深酒沙?炒米酒金?  
· 为什么上易趣能赚钱? ·

帮助  
· 怎样通过实名认证成为易趣会员?  
· 易趣的付款方式?  
· 哪些情况下可以对对方交易提疑?

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网络销售代理加盟

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

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Source: Accessed via Internet Wayback Machine.



Exhibit 6 Why Do Buyers and Sellers Use C2C Websites?



Source: iResearch, Shanghai: China C2C Ecommerce Research Report 2005.

**Exhibit 7** User Satisfaction Taobao and eBay (2004)

(in percent)	Taobao	eBay
Very satisfied	24.3	10.9
Satisfied	52.2	51.5
So so	21.4	31.3
Not satisfied	2.1	6.3

Source: Company documents.

**Exhibit 8** Market Shares of C2C Marketplaces—by Gross Merchandise Volume (GMV)

(in percentage)	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Taobao		7.8	29	59	65	84
eBay (TOM Eachnet) <sup>a</sup>	85	72.4	65	36	26	7
PaiPai					4	9
Others	15	19.8	6	5	5	0

Source: Company documents.

<sup>a</sup>TOM Eachnet was a joint venture between eBay and TOM Online, established in December 2006.

**Exhibit 9** Growth of Online Shopping Sites

	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
<b>All Online Shopping Sites</b>						
Registered users (millions)	8.4	15.2	22.4	32.5	43.1	55.0
GMV (RMB billion)	1.3	1.9	5.1	15.7	25.8	56.1

Source: Company documents.

**Exhibit 10** Popular Products on Taobao

	2006	2007
Most popular products		
Rank #1	Mobile handsets	Clothes
Rank #2	Notebooks	Mobile handsets
Rank #3	Clothes	Cosmetics
Rank #4	Cosmetics	Home products
Rank #5	Cameras	Home appliances
New products (%)	91	
Buy it now (%) <sup>a</sup>	99	
Transactions using Alipay (%)	86	

Source: iResearch China Online Shopping Research Report (2007–2008).

<sup>a</sup>“Buy it now” refers to transactions in which sellers and buyers negotiate a price. The remaining transactions used auctions to determine prices



## Endnotes

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<sup>3</sup> "Unlocking the Chinese Internet Market," *China International Business*, June 2008.

<sup>4</sup> Chua, Roy, Michael Morris and Paul Ingram, "Guanxi versus Networking: Distinctive Configurations of Affect- and Cognition-based Trust in the Networks of Chinese versus American Managers." *Journal of International Business Studies*, forthcoming.

<sup>5</sup> Zhangxi Lin and Jun Li, "The Online Auction Market in China: A Comparative Study between Taobao and eBay." *ACM International Conference Proceeding Series 2005* (113): 123-129.

<sup>6</sup> Shuang Li, Jing Luo, Jian He and H.J. Cai, "Trust Build-up in Online Transactions." *Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing*, 2007: 3513-3516.

<sup>7</sup> Shuang Li, Jing Luo, Jian He and H.J. Cai, "Trust Build-up in Online Transactions." *Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing*, 2007: 3513-3516.

<sup>8</sup> Eric Auchard, "Rivals Taobao, eBay clash on whether free is best." *CRN*, 21 October 2005, at <http://www.crn.com.au/News/20610,rivals-taobao-ebay-clash-on-whether-free-is-best.aspx>.

<sup>9</sup> Ken Belson, Rob Hof and Ben Elgin, "How Yahoo! Japan Beat eBay at Its Own Game," *BusinessWeek*, 4 June 2001.

<sup>10</sup> Sherman So, "Tencent profit jumps on one-off gain," *The Standard*, 25 August 2005.

<sup>11</sup> Sherman So, "Tencent profit jumps on one-off gain," *The Standard*, 25 August 2005.